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Abstract 
The study applies an adjusted growth diagnostic approach to identify the actual binding 
constraint on financing growth in the West Balkan countries. This group of economies 
includes combined structural and systemic transformation problems.  The results of the 
analysis indicate that the binding constraint on credit and investment growth in the region is 
the high and still increasing share of non-performing loans primarily in the private household 
sector due to policy failures. The analysis is performed in comparison with a group of 
advanced transition economies. Single-country and panel regressions indicate that demand 
side factors do not play a constraining role in the West Balkan countries but in the advanced 
transition economies.  
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The binding constraints on growth in less developed Western Balkan countries 
 
1. Introduction 
The overarching objective of the study is the identification of the binding constraint on 
growth in the countries of the Western Balkans (WBs). This region includes the successor 
states of socialist Yugoslavia and Albania and was selected for its combination of underlying 
structural and systemic transformation problems that are typical of many European (and some 
non-European) emerging markets. Initiating systemic transformation from a middle-income 
position and with some degree of industrialization, all WB countries experienced huge losses 
in welfare, productivity and social capacities during their transition to a market economy, a 
move that was further aggravated by ethnic conflicts and national wars of independence in 
some regions during the 1990s. Labor emigration, traditional for former Yugoslavia, is on-
going in most post-Yugoslav countries as well as in Albania. After a period of recovery in 
these countries, economic stagnation followed in 2009. Since then, not only has growth been 
experiencing a downward trend, but investment and financing are also low, thus hindering the 
start of a sustained economic growth and catch-up process. A second aim of the study is to 
take advantage of an adjusted growth diagnostics (GD) approach in the quest for the binding 
constraint on growth. The approach applied herein deviates from the original and from those 
in the literature in two respects. While the original approach holds a supply-side perspective 
and is devoted to developing countries, this study first tests possible demand constraints on 
growth, a factor that may be important in countries with some degree of industrialization. 
Second, while the existing literature applies the GD approach to single countries, the 
investigation herein covers a region of independent countries that have some relevant 
commonalities. These two deviations present novelties to the extant literature. 
 
The remainder of the study is organized in five consecutive steps. Section 2 assesses the 
applicability of the original GD approach to a region of countries with mixed features 
including underdevelopment and systemic transformation. Thus, it argues for an adjusted 
diagnostic tree that includes possible demand-side as well as supply-side constraints. Sections 
3 to 6 present steps in the identification of the binding constraint on growth. The results 
indicate that financial intermediation (section 3) and the size and increase of non-performing 
loans (npls) in the banking sector are important factors (section 4). Section 5 focuses on the 
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causes of the npls in the WBs by separating the possible impacts of losses on effective 
demand and on the impacts of market and policy failures, which constitute supply-side 
constraints, on growth via npls. Section 6 presents systematic evidence of the prevailing 
constraints on lending and growth by running country and panel regressions. This section is 
unique with respect to the existing GD literature as it adds to the typical qualitative  analysis 
econometric techniques, and it determines that aggregate demand has, at best, minimal 
relevance on lending to the corporate sector in the WBs region, while npls on the supply-side 
do have such relevance. Section 7 presents policy and methodological implications.  
2. A review of methodological foundations and applications of the GD approach 
The GD approach brings the numerous and side-by-side existing constraints on growth 
(factors related to policy, markets, institutions, geography and resource endowments) into a 
diagnostic order. Identifying a constraint to be a binding one in a given period of time does 
not exclude other constraints, but rather sets the agenda for prioritizing policy actions. The 
actual binding constraint is important in that it implies it may be replaced by another 
constraint once the policy action successfully resolves the initial constraint. Hausman et al. 
(2006) suggest using the original diagnostic or decision tree, which has been applied in the 
majority of previous studies1 With respect to low levels of private investment and 
entrepreneurship, Hausman et al. (2006) formulate two possible explanations (in their diction: 
‘decisions’) at the first branch of the tree - either the real rate of return is too low or the cost of 
finance is too high. When it is not the low rate of return, the binding constraint can be 
determined by turning to the high cost of finance branch. Using stepwise exclusion of 
possible barriers to growth at each juncture of this branch, the binding constraint can be 
identified. Of course, given that the original tree is not a dogma, the diagnostician may draw a 
different tree related to his/her specific research question. However, whatever decision tree 
the diagnostician might wish to design, two fundamental issues require critical discussion - 
the original GD tree is a single-country approach, and it is a supply-side approach.  
 
The first characteristic distinguishes it from policy conclusions á la the Washington consensus 
wherein, not surprisingly, the GD approach is the outcome of the debates between 1995 and 
2006 regarding the appropriateness of the consensus on policy reforms in developing 
countries at the end of the 1990s. For these policy reforms, the Washington consensus claims 
a best practice approach derived from then prevailing textbook economics and applicable to 
                                                           
1 I abstain from presenting the figure in Hausman et al. (2006) as it is well-known and can be found in almost 
every paper on the GD approach.  
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every developing country experiencing economic troubles. Disappointing results in the 1990s 
led to the argument that the quality of institutions is important and their improvement should 
be included in the reform prescriptions. However, while policy reforms could be narrowed to 
the well-known ‘10 commandments’ of the original Washington consensus, the field for 
institutional reforms appears boundless, as noted by Rodrik (2006, p. 980), ‘So open ended is 
the agenda that even the most ambitious institutional reform efforts can be faulted ex-post for 
having left something out’ (Rodrik 2006, p. 980). Carlin (2010) observes a transfer of high 
quality, a credible market and public institutions to East Germany by virtue of unification, yet 
the costs of these institutional transfers were high and performance was, in many ways, 
similar to that of its comparators in other transition regions (Carlin 2010). The question 
remains, however which institutions should be identified to enter a growth-enhancing policy 
concept and how should these institutions be identified. The logical answer is quite simple - it 
depends on the particularities of a given country at a given point or period of time. This factor 
differentiates the GD approach from the earlier ‘one size fits all’ reform concepts.  
 
The original and widely used GD approach does not differ from the earlier concepts with 
respect to its supply-side perspective as it excludes constraints on effective demand.2 GD is 
rooted in the neoclassical theory of endogenous growth, which explains growth by the 
provisions of resources to the production process. Thus, growth is a real sector phenomenon. 
The basic concept is that growth is the result of additional physical or human capital 
(productive capacity), and the typical diagnostic tree is shaped by political, geographic and 
institutional constraints on physical capital and entrepreneurship. However, low private 
investment could be due to underutilized capacities and pessimistic forecasts regarding the 
future state of the economy by the real sector, which might prefer to reduce debt and 
borrowing. Nevertheless, despite many theoretical and practical shortcomings and ambiguities 
(for an overview, see Felipe et al., 2011), the GD approach may be a useful practical 
methodology for determining a possible binding constraint on growth when it is applied to 
economies where supply-side constraints are important. However, as this cannot be assumed a 
priori, it must be tested. Apparently, supply constraints may be prevalent in developing 
countries. Kalecki (1966) notes that the typical problem of a developing (or underdeveloped) 
economy is the coincidence of unemployment (or underemployment) and fully utilized 
                                                           
2 Rodrik (2010) presents a different tree that includes supply- and demand-side constraints. However, his 
understanding of demand-side constraints does not differ from the  original scheme, as he explains a low demand 
for private investment by the typical supply-side factors of this scheme.    
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capacities.  The existing stock of physical capital, which is not quite high enough to employ 
the entire labor force, may be fully utilized at the same time. On the other side, the typical 
problem of a developed capitalist economy is the lack of effective demand as the source of the 
coincidence of unemployment and underutilized capacities. Accordingly, developing 
countries must speed up structural transformation (Rodrik, 2010). The major problem of a 
developing economy is, namely, the transformation from a rural, agricultural society to an 
industrial society. Typically, a developing country abounds with labor but is lacking in 
physical capital. According to neoclassical predictions, a short supply in capital should 
increase the real returns on investment, while the problem with the high cost of finance could 
be solved by financial liberalization and state finance programs.  
 
With this in mind, we consider countries that may not have a structural transformation 
problem but need to more quickly engage in systemic transformation from a socialist to a 
market economy. Such a transition country suffers output losses due to the lack of effective 
demand for the previously produced industrial commodities. The typical transformation 
problem is the re-allocation of labor and capital between industries and regions, which is 
partly coupled with transitory high unemployment, while a developing country is 
characterized by permanent unemployment or underemployment. If a transition economy also 
has a developed industrial basis, such as the Czech Republic, this industrial basis may 
constitute a demand constraint according to Kalecki, and thus, changes in effective demand 
will lead the reallocation and growth processes. This understanding is the essence of the 
critical literature on the application of supply-side solutions to transition countries such as 
East Germany (former GDR), the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, and Poland (see Brada 
and King, 1992; Bhaduri and Laski, 1997). However, if the transition country shows 
increased signs of a developing economy, it must also solve the dual problem of a structural 
and a systemic transformation, and thus, the diagnostician must assess whether, and the 
degree to which, growth is supply constrained in one period or demand constrained in 
another.  
  
Accordingly, most of the GD literature investigates developing countries. The only exception 
is Carlin’s study on East Germany as a successor of highly industrialized German Democratic 
Republic (Carlin, 2010) when it was already part of unified Germany. With almost unlimited 
access to public finance as well as international capital markets, Carlin concluded that neither 
government failures nor the high cost of finance was the binding constraint affecting 
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industrialized East Germany but rather that the problem was due to market failures with 
respect to the labor market and the increase in East German wages. However, Carlin’s study 
rules out the negative demand shock in a highly industrialized region as East Germany was 
part of an advanced market economy. Earlier investigations of East Germany emphasize the 
existence of a massive demand shock for East German producers after the unification 
(Gabrisch, 1995). The shock was attributed to the severe overvaluation of the GDR currency 
against the Deutsche Mark.   
 
A look into Rodrik’s homepage3 reveals that European transition countries experiencing 
dominating development and, thus, supply-side problems were subject to GD. In a study by 
Sen and Kirckpatrick (2011) on Kosovo’s early years, the authors, using data from 2004 to 
2006, find the binding constraints on growth to be the high costs of and restricted access to 
finance, the poor provision of public goods and weaknesses in the rule of law. This result, 
however, seems inconclusive as there are too many binding constraints on both main branches 
of the decision tree. A related study on Moldova (Stratan and Chistruga, 2012) finds the 
restrictive access to domestic finance responsible for the excessively high costs associated 
with interest rates and transaction costs. Babych and Fuenfzig (2012) determine that human 
capital and road infrastructure are the binding constraints on growth in Georgia. Kuzmanovic 
and Sanfey (2014) identify micro risks resulting from government failures to be the binding 
constraint in Serbia, followed by constraints on access to finance. All of the aforementioned 
countries belong to the group of developing countries according to the World Bank 
classification.4  
 
Carlin’s study of East Germany and Lea et al. (2011)’s study of northeastern Afghanistan 
uncover another methodological problem. Specifically, can the GD approach be reasonably 
applied to a region of a country or – in the opposite direction – to a group of countries? It 
seems that the regional approach eliminates those possible constraints in the decision tree 
where the central government is responsible for certain policy actions, such as fiscal and 
monetary policies. In such an event, the diagnostician cannot be certain that the identified 
supply constraint is the actual binding constraint. On the other hand, more than one country 
raises the question of whether it would be best to apply a more general and textbook 
approach, such as the Washington consensus, and to recommend policies that fit all 
                                                           
3 http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/drodrik/GrowthDiag.html. Last accessed 22 September 2014. 
4 http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups#Europe_and_Central_Asia. Last accessed 29 
October 2014. 
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circumstances. The fact that countries differ in history, institutions, resources, initial 
distortions and other initial conditions implies that customization in the diagnostic is critical 
(Leipziger and Zagha, 2006), and from this results the spare use of econometric techniques. 
Nonetheless, cross-country studies may help to identify growth bottlenecks at the macro and 
micro levels due to the availability of more data, as in the study by Loayza et al. (2005). 
Therefore, the answer is a pragmatic one that requires an understanding of the similarities 
among the countries.  
 
What are the conclusions with respect to the WB countries? Socialist Yugoslavia was a 
middle-income economy with glaring regional contrasts in levels of development and 
prosperity. Socialist Albania was and is a developing economy at the upper middle-income 
per capita level as Serbia is. Today, while Croatia and Slovenia are listed as high-income 
economies, only Slovenia is a member of the OECD (since 2010) and, hence, is accepted as 
an advanced economy. However, in 2008, after a decade of economic recovery and growth, 
the labor force participation rate approached 60 % in Croatia. In the other countries, the rate 
was near or below 50 %, with high shares of employment in the shadow economy or in low-
productive agriculture. For comparison, the ratio was at approximately 70 % in Germany and 
60 %, on average, in the new member states of the EU (sources: Eurostat and national 
statistics). Therefore, it is not ex ante to hypothesize whether growth is constrained by bad 
management of the structural transformation process typical of developing economies or by 
bad management of the systemic transformation process including demand management and 
market failures typical of transition countries. All countries form a geographic region much as 
the various regions of a single state form a geographic region. It is more plausible for a multi-
country study to examine neighboring countries than countries that are spread throughout the 
world. Second, all of the neighboring countries share related histories, cultures, institutions, 
and even languages (Slavic ones and Albanian). Particularly, seven of the countries exhibit 
distinctive features common to the Yugoslav-type start-up model, which is different from that 
of East Germany, which has a completely different history and economy when unified with 
West Germany. Third, all of the countries have a specific relation to the European Union in 
that their internal and external policies are influenced by the Union. Furthermore, all of the 
countries are accession or pre-accession candidates, while Croatia is already a member. Thus, 
it is concluded that group convergence between them and the Union is currently in progress. 
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The diagnosis that follows covers the period between 2007 and mid-2014 and includes seven 
countries - Albania, Bosnia and Hercegowina (‘BiH’), Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia (WB-7). The choice of the period is dominated by the availability of 
data. Comparisons are performed with the five new member states of the EU (NMS-5) that 
are already OECD members. These include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak 
Republic (all since 1994) and Slovenia (since 2010). Croatia is spatialized to the WB-group 
because it entered the EU in 2013, though it is not yet a member of the OECD.  
 
 
3.  first step: focus on returns and cost  
Private investment must be financed. Given that financing overwhelmingly involves debt 
financing in the WBs, bank credit dominates as everywhere throughout Europe. Figure 1 
provides a first glimpse of financing and illustrates the quarterly development of bank credit 
to the non-financial private corporate sector. The peak of strong credit growth in the recovery 
period since the late 1990s was achieved in six out of the seven WB countries in September 
2008 (when Lehman Brothers defaulted); Montenegro was the outlier; here the peak was a 
couple of years earlier The countries of the region entered a period of stagnation a short time 
later (roughly two quarters later). The beginning of the period of stagnation in the NMS-5 
countries was similar, though there was some recovery in Poland in 2011/2012, which was 
followed again by a slump. Clearly, the evidence provided in Figure 1 for both groups 
includes the impacts of external and internal supply and/or demand shocks, each of which 
might exhibit moments of dominance.  
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Figure 1: Quarterly credit to the non-financial private corporate sector in % against the 
previous year 
 
Sources: Based on WIIW monthly data worksheets. 
 
The quest for the binding supply constraint begins with the traditional first question:5 Is a 
decline in the return to economic activity the barrier to (the recovery of) investment and 
credit, or is it an increase in the cost of finance, which then implies that many private 
investment projects will not be financed when the (expected) returns to economic activity are 
lower than the real cost of the finance? We use proxies for both indicators (returns and costs) 
as they cannot be directly observed. For the real rate of return, the incremental capital output 
ratio (ICOR) provides some insights.6 The ICOR assesses the marginal amount of investment 
capital necessary for the economy to generate the next unit of production or aggregate income 
and is defined as 
)/(
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=  where ∆Y/Y is the real rate of change of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) and I/Y is the share of the gross fixed investment in the GDP. The 
measure, however, has some shortcomings. For example, it does not correct for changes in 
income distribution or different inflation rates for investment goods and the GDP. 
Additionally, the return is generated by the existing capital stock, while new capital could 
yield higher returns. The cost of finance cannot be measured by itself, but rather, it is 
measured with the real interest rate on long-term investment credit in the foreign exchange 
                                                           
5 The informed reader will notice that this question presents the first level of the diagnostic tree in Hausman et al. 
(2006).  
6 Other indicators used in the literature assess social returns like income of human capital or returns of some 
sectors (infrastructure). The ICOR reflects macroeconomic returns. 
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(FX) market. While the interest rate is a price signal, the costs of finance are determined also 
by non-price signals such as the amount of credit, the currency, the duration, the industry 
and/or the collateral. A high interest rate does not necessarily signal high financial costs as 
credit offices of banks may be willing to soften the non-price components of the credit. This 
choice of FX lending is justified by the high euroization in the region’s financial 
intermediation. The common use of the Euro and other international reserve currencies 
follows from the lower nominal interest rates in these currencies compared to financing in 
local currency. Therefore, what matters is the interest rate on FX loans and the inflation rate 
of the lending currency.  
 
Figure 2: ICORsa and real interest ratesb (means 2002-2013) 
 
a Calculations based on fixed capital investment.  b Real interest rate: Nominal interest rate of local Euro loans 
minus the Euro area inflation rate (HCPI). Investment credit: In most cases from 1 to 3 or 5 years, various 
periods for the initial rate fixation; for BiH: outstanding loans; Serbia: non-financial corporations only.   
 
Sources: Calculations based on WIIW data base /(ICORs), National Banks data and Eurostat (nominal interest 
rates and Euro area inflation).  
 
Figure 2 provides the results of the calculations for the period 2002 to 2013. The ICORs in the 
WB countries tend to be lower than those in the NMS-5 countries, suggesting somewhat 
higher real returns on investment. A negative ICOR, such as that for Macedonia and the 
Czech Republic, signals even negative returns. The real interest rates also tend to be higher in 
WB countries as evidenced by the mean values in the right panel of figure 2. For both groups, 
interest rates on Euro credits are substantially higher than those in the Euro area. Surveys 
among credit officers of banks revealed persistent restrictions with respect to the amount of 
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credit, currency, duration or collateral since the outbreak of the crisis (Vienna Initiative 2013, 
European Investment Bank 2014), thus suggesting the tentatively high cost of borrowing at 
least since the outbreak of the output and lending crisis in 2009 compared to the expected 
returns on investment in the WB countries. Accordingly, the binding supply side constraint in 
the NMS-5 seems to be the low return on investment.  
 
 
4. A second step: focus on the determinants of the cost of finance 
There are at least three candidates for the high cost of lending in WB countries - liquidity 
shortages, low competition, and high default risks.  
 
The liquidity argument: Interest rates might be high if the credit market is tight due to poor 
access to international finance or the low depth of financial intermediation. Poor access to 
international finance is apparently the least likely constraint. All WB countries opened their 
financial sectors to international financial corporations, mainly EU banking groups, and 
liberalized cross-border capital flows. The dynamic growth in lending before the outbreak of 
the global financial crisis indicates that it is not the poor access to finance, which could be 
eased by lifting the legal restrictions. Rather, the reason for such fall in lending is found in the 
lending restrictions imposed by the local banks and funding restrictions imposed by the 
international owners. Furthermore, there is another possible candidate for liquidity shortages - 
the low level of financial intermediation. Table 1 illustrates the financial sector assets in 
percent of the GDP. It is noted that these are far below those in the Euro area, and they seem 
to be somewhat lower than those in the NMS-5. Macedonia shows the lowest share, followed 
by Serbia. A low level restricts the flow of liquidity and drives up lending rates for the 
corporate sector. However, as this source of liquidity shortage is a structural determinant, it 
may not explain the previous boom in lending followed by a severe drop.  
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Table 1: Debt vs. market financing and structure of debt financing (averages 2007-2011)  
 
In % of GDP Shares in % of all financial sector assets 
 
Financial 
sector 
assets  
Stock 
market 
capitalize-
tion 
Commer-
cial banks 
Central 
bank 
Mutual 
Funds 
Insurances Pension 
funds 
WB-7   
   
   Albania 64.7 n.a.  89.5 10.5 0.0a 2.2b 0.0c 
   Bosnia and  Herzegowina 60.8 n.a.  86.7 0.2 6.9 6.3 n.a. 
   Kosovo n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
   Croatia 105.6 54.8 77.7 0.2 5.1 8.0 9.0 
   Macedonia 49.6 19.5 85.9 2.6 1.8 6.0b 3.6c 
   Montenegro 73.1 81.9 100.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
   Serbia 50.4 32.1 91.5 0.8 n.a. 7.1 0.6 
  
   
NMS-5   
   
Poland 62.8 33.3 53.2 0.0e 9.1 16.6 21.2 
Slovak Republic 80.3 5.9 76.1 0.0 5.9 10.3 7.7 
Czech Republic 57.8 27.0 66.1 0.3d 5.0 18.9 9.7 
Hungary 80.6 23.0 59.6 1.2 15.0 11.0 13.2 
Slovenia 116.2 29.9 81.2 0.3 4.9 12.0 1.5 
  
   
Memorandum: Euro aread 189.0 54.0 71.2 0.9 8.5 16.9 3.0 
a 2009-2010 b 2009, c 2007-2010, d 18 countries. e 2008.  
Sources: Calculations based on Federal Reserve Bank of St, Louis online database; accessed14 October 2013.  
 
 
Table 2: Banking system indicators: concentration, spreads, capital ratios  
 Concentration Lending-
Deposit Rate  
Capital 
Adequacy 
Ratio Boone Index
a Hirschman-
Herfindahl 
Indexb 
 Ø 2007-2010 2010 Ø 2007-2011 2013 
WB-7     
   Albania -0.013 1400 6,7 17.0 
   BiH -0.036 999 4,2 17.0h 
   Kosovo k. A. 2000 10,3d 17.2h 
   Croatia -0.057 1362 7,8 20.8 
   Macedonia -0.064 1578 3,5 17.3 
   Montenegro -0.090 1467 6,4e 14.7h 
   Serbia -0,089 629 7,2 20.4 
 
NMS-5 
    
   Poland -0,078 568 k. A.  15.7 
   Slovak Republic 0,035 1221 k. A.  15.9 
   Czech Republic -0,074 999 4,7 16.4 
   Hungary -0,062 872 2,5 16.6 
Slovenia -0.017 1150 3.2f 11.9h 
     
    Memorandum: Euro areag -0,041 1099 k. A.  12.7i 
a
 Unweighted average;  
b
 New member states and Euro area countries: 2012. c June 2012; d 2008-2011; e 2011-
2012; f 2008-2010; g 11 countries. h 2012. Unweighted average 2007-2011.  
Sources: Compiled from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis online database; accessed 20 January, World Bank 
(2013); national banks of the countries and European Central Bank online, accessed 20 October 2013.  
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Low competition: While low competition among banks may drive up lending rates, this is not 
a striking feature of the region, with the exception of Kosovo. Table 2 presents a selection of 
the most common concentration measures in the literature. The Boone index, which captures 
direct lending by international banks, signals lower competition throughout the region 
compared to that of the Euro area. Because direct lending is rather low in the West Balkans 
for the overwhelming foreign ownership of local banks, the Hirschman-Herfindahl index is 
not necessarily less meaningful than the Boone index, and it shows two extreme cases: The 
first is that market power is high in Kosovo, which has only eight banks, and accordingly, 
high lending-deposit spreads signal high cost of borrowing for corporations. The second 
extreme case is that competition is strong in Serbia, which has 33 banks.  
 
Figure 3: Non-performing loans in % of all credits of the banking sector (period mean values) 
 
Sources: Calculations based on the online database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis accessed on 13 
October 2014 (2002-2011); monthly data worksheets of the WIIW (2012 and 2013 and complete for 
Montenegro); World Bank (2013b) (Kosovo).  
Credit default risk: The cost of finance may be high when the risk of default is high. When 
banks fear higher risks, they expand capital adequacy ratios and loan-loss reserves, and 
furthermore, the liquidity they provide to the credit market is restricted. Capital adequacy 
ratios are, by far, higher in the banking system of the WB countries than in the Euro area, and 
they are also somewhat higher than in the NMS-5 countries (Table 3, last column). Also, 
leverage ratios were lower than in the EU illustrating the absence of undercapitalized banking 
systems.7 However, the main problem is the strong increase in loan-loss reserves during the 
recent crisis, an increase that reflects the increasing risk of default due to the share of non-
                                                           
7 Data from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis online database; not shown here. 
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performing loans8 (npls) in gross loans in the banking sector. Figure 3 compares the ratio of 
npls in total bank credits for two periods (2002 to 2008 and 2009 to 20013), and Figure 4 adds 
the split between non-financial corporations and private households. Banks do not only 
increase their reserves and withdraw liquidity, but they also suffer from higher refunding 
costs and bear costs of depreciation, thus resulting in increased lending rates. The severe 
decline in lending depicted in Figure 1 finds its reflection in the increase in the npls, as shown 
in Figures 3 and 4.  
 
Figure 4: Non-performing loans in % of all credits of the banking sector to non-financial 
corporations and private households (period mean values)a 
 
 
a No private household data available for Slovenia. 
Sources: Calculations based on monthly worksheets of the WIIW; fourth quarter; data for Serbia 2006-2008 only 
2008. 
                                                           
8 Claims overdue 90 days or more are classified as non-performing according to international standards. 
However, the classification suffers from different definitions in different countries (Barisitz 2011).   
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5. A third step: focus on the causes of the npl problem  
The diagnosis would not be complete without an identification of the causes of the npl 
problem. Apparently, there are external and internal causes. Jakubik and Reiniger (2013), 
applying a dynamic panel analysis to 9 central-east and south European Countries, test for 
several possible impact factors. While their study incorporates Russia and the Ukraine, only 
Croatia from the WB region was included. They found GDP growth to be the primary driver 
correlated negatively with the development of npls. This assessment is based on the size of 
the coefficient of the variables. The GDP variable showed the highest coefficient when 
compared to the stock market index, past credit growth, and exchange rate changes.  
 
However, there may be additional causes of the npls that are particularly relevant to the WB 
region.  For example, there is evidence suggesting that information asymmetries may play a 
role in npls, especially as the vulnerability of a loan portfolio depends on the quality of risk 
analysis prior to lending. Risk management was apparently poor throughout the WB region 
during the boom period even though international standards were implemented with the 
arrival of international banks in the region. The standards, however, were damaged because 
credit committees sought to gain market shares in situations where credit registers were still 
underdeveloped or non-existent.9 Consequently, loans were granted to new clients with 
unknown credit histories. This situation has improved because public or private registers are 
now in place in all countries.  
 
A second source of high npls is the lack of foreign exchange hedging. A lack of hedging 
appears to have been a major source of inefficient FX lending structure when borrowers do 
not earn wages in foreign currency. This is evident when examining mortgage lending to 
private households. According to the Albanian National Bank, close to 49 % of all bank 
credits were not hedged against exchange rate instability. The Croatian National Bank reports 
a share of 93 % for the first quarter of 2013. FX hedging, which requires forward markets and 
leads to risk sharing between contract partners are underdeveloped in the West Balkan region.  
 
Lack of a market for doubtful debts is another obvious cause of npls. In advanced market 
economies as well as in some transition countries, asset management companies (AMCs) 
                                                           
9 This is a finding the author gathered from many interviews in banks of the region.  
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address doubtful bank portfolios and play a major role in npl resolution and recovery. This 
market, while well developed in Poland due to appropriate regulations, is still in a very 
embryonic state in the West Balkan countries due to the lack of transparency in npl 
classification and the lack of regulations for international AMCs.  
 
 Policy failures must also be considered as a source of npls. A specific policy failure occurred 
in Albania when the public sector built up payment arrears vis-à-vis the private corporate 
sector. This was a main contribution to the increase in npls in that country between 2009 and 
2012. However, a region-wide factor for the increase in npls was the bailout expectations in 
the banking sector. The inactivity of the commercial banks to facilitate npl recovery and 
resolution was egregious as lenders preferred to wait for government bailouts of over-
indebted corporations and private households. This behavior is only partly rooted in weak law 
enforcement, e.g., collecting collaterals. However, completely irrevocable debt, which 
requires liquidation of borrower equity, involves only a fraction of the npls, while a large 
fraction could be recovered with a temporary adaption of credit conditions and other 
resolution schemes. Governments and regulation authorities have even encouraged bailout 
expectations by their forbearance and created a new wait-and-see option for banks. When 
governments launch enterprise restructuring programs coupled with subsidies, such as in 
Serbia, banks might wait and see and expect governments to restructure insolvent banks at 
high fiscal costs rather than be forced to create their own restructuring plans. Regulation 
authorities in most countries attenuated the classification of assets and the rules for dealing 
with non-performing loans.  
 
6. The final step: econometric testing of demand and supply factors  
Econometric testing in GD is rather rare. When applied, however, a traditional micro based 
production function is used with growth as the dependent variable and the typical input 
factors (Loayza et al. 2005). This section follows another path based on the results presented 
in the previous sections, which have led us to hypothesize about the role of non-performing 
loans in the banking sector. That is, high or rising npls are the main drivers for the high cost 
of finance via the deprivation of liquidity, higher nominal interest rates and a deterioration of 
non-price components of lending. This, in turn, reduces the ability and willingness of the 
private corporate sector to borrow. The aim of the following regression analysis10 is to add 
systematic evidence. The number of explanatory variables is reduced due to the small sample 
                                                           
10 All calculations are performed using the Eviews-8 software. 
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size or to the absence of data for institutional variables at all. The dependent variable is the 
rate of change of bank credit to the non-financial corporate sector ( variable CSCR). The 
explanatory variables include lagged variables of non-performing loan ratios (NPLCS: 
corporate sector, NPLPH: private households). The lagged real GDP rate of change enters the 
tests as the economy’s aggregate demand side. Lagged variables mitigate the possible 
problem of endogeneity between the dependent variable and the regressors. Consistent with 
the literature, the credit rate of change should exhibit some degree of persistence. Hence, the 
one-period lagged CSCR rate is added. Because the CSCR variable is in nominal terms, 
consumer price inflation rate (IFR) completes the set of explanatory variables, thus implying 
that a positive sign of the coefficient reveals that banks consider to maintain lending levels in 
real terms. The data were collected from national banks and mostly provided by the Vienna 
Institute of International Studies (WIIW)11. They cover the period from 2007q1 to2014q2. 
CSCR, GDP and IFR are annualized quarterly rates of change. Multicollinearity may be 
relevant as Jakubik and Reiniger (2013) find the real rate of growth to be a major determinant 
for the development of the npl ratio. The treatment of a possible problem includes assessing 
the size of the problem by calculating variance inflation factors (VIF) and not to focus on 
multicollinearity when values are less than 10.  
 
The analysis is conducted in two steps. The first step includes single-country estimations for 
those countries that provide a minimum of unlagged observations. This step is equivalent to 
the traditional GD single-country approach. From the WB region, tests include Albania (only 
npl ratios, no split between sectors), Croatia and Macedonia; included from the NMS-5 region 
are the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Poland. The number of observations before 
adjustments is 30 (27 for Poland). Unit root tests produce different outcomes for the variables, 
while the ADF test reveals CSCR to have a unit root, and the Phillips-Perron and KPSS tests 
report no unit root. The results show similar results for the other variables, though the results 
differ among the countries. Hence, no unambiguous conclusion can be drawn, and tests are 
thus based on rates of change with respect to the CSCR, IFR and GDP and on first differences 
with respect to npl variables. This has the advantage of reducing possible non-linearities in 
the levels, which, while the non-linearities may represent feedback between variables, they 
also increase the threat of biased coefficients. The chosen lag for all variables except the 
inflation rate IFR is one period due to the small number of observations as this may reduce 
the effectiveness of the models. To avoid possible problems of heteroskedasticity and 
                                                           
11 Available on request only.  
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autocorrelation of unknown form, econometric literature proposes using the generalized 
method of moments (GMM). However, the small panel size does not promise larger 
efficiency gains when one uses additionally lagged variables as instruments for an already 
limited number of observations. Therefore, the test equation is a linear OLS regression 
according to  
tititititititi GDP+PLPH+PLCSIFRCSCRCSCR ,1,1,41,3,21,10, εααααα ++∆+∆+++= −−−−  (1) 
where i captures the country, t denotes time, and ε is the stochastic error term. The Harvey 
test for homogeneity is performed, and recursive estimations (CUSUM and CUSUM-squared) 
test for stability and forecast quality  
The second step adds dynamic panel estimates. Panel data techniques allow mitigating the 
threats of heteroskedasticity and omitted variable biases in regressions. The latter is important 
with respect to possibly relevant institutional variables, which the models do not consider due 
to the lack of appropriate time series data. The higher number of observations also offers an 
opportunity to experiment with more lags and sub-periods. Nevertheless, the sizes of the 
panels with respect to both periods and units are too small to apply with great credit GMM 
techniques. Thus, two panels are estimated. The first panel includes five WB countries and 
excludes Kosovo (no quarterly GDP data) and Albania (no npl ratios for the corporate and 
household sectors). The second panel includes data from the five NMS countries. Tests on 
panel stationarity indicate that the CSCR and the first differences of the npl ratios are, again, 
stationary. In contrast to the single-country approach, the inflation rate and the GDP rate of 
change are now unambiguously panel stationary. Equation (2) describes the regression model 
for panels p=1…4, i is the country involved in the panel, t denotes the quarter, and τ 
represents the lag 
...,,,4,,,3,,,21,,,10,, +∆+∆+++= −−− ττ ααααα tpiptpiptpiptpiptpi +PLPH+PLCSIFRCSCRCSCR  
            
                (2) 
ptipipttpipGDP ,,,,,,,5.... εδηα τ ++++ −  
Panel regressions entail fixed effects (period η and cross-section δ), and ε is the stochastic 
error term. Redundant fixed effects tests (F-statistics) are applied to determine which fixed 
effects specifications are preferred in the regressions.  
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Table 3 presents the estimation results for the single-country approach. As expected, lending 
to the corporate sector shows some persistence in all cases, while inflation does not play a 
role for lending dynamics. With respect to the main question, there is no conclusion for 
Albania and Croatia as all variables are insignificant except the lagged dependent variable. 
With respect to Macedonia, there is strong evidence for the impact of change in demand as the 
GDP has a positive sign and is highly significant. This picture is repeated for all three 
countries from the NMS group. In the case of Poland, lending to corporations also suffers 
from the npl problem. In no country does the inflation rate exert an impact on lending and the 
adjusted R-squared values are implausibly high either due to the prevalence of unit roots in 
the data and/or to problems of multicollinearity. The standard error of regression shows 
reasonable values and provides a better description of the explanatory power of the 
regression, while the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics signal slight or no serial correlation, a 
finding confirmed by the Q-statistics of squared residuals, which reject the null of serial 
correlation. Harvey F statistics suggests that one cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity except for Croatia. Hence, the error term is “white noise” in five out of the 
six cases. CUSUM and CUSUM-squared tests report stability in the equations for Croatia, the 
Czech Republic and Poland, though not for Macedonia or the Slovak Republic. Variance 
inflation factors close to unity or below signal minimal to no correlation between the 
regressors. The main problem is related to the unit roots in the data as they affect the 
efficiency of regression output. In regressions with first differences of all variables (not 
shown here), the adjusted R-squared values are heavily downsized to levels of less than 0.55 
and, in some cases, even to negative levels, thus confirming the suspicion of biased regression 
results in Table 3. However, while these regressions repeat the same results in signs and 
significances in grosso modo for all six economies, the first differences of the GDP rate of 
change or the inflation rate do not share the same intuitive economic understanding. 
Additional regressions with other lags do not change the sign structure, but do change the 
level of significance. For example, npl ratios become weakly significant with negative signs 
in the cases of Macedonia and Poland. A striking result of regression results as presented in 
Table 3 is the insignificance of the npl variables, with the exception of Poland, although 
coefficients often take a negative sign, which is consistent with the idea that an increase in npl 
ratios has a negative impact on bank lending to the corporate sector. A possible explanation 
for insignificance is that the single country regressions encompass two states of the economy, 
roughly described as pre-crisis and crisis periods with two different regimes – a demand 
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driven and a supply driven one. This issue can be better analyzed using a panel approach that 
includes more observations.   
Table 3: Results of selected country regressions with OLS (period: 2007q1-2014q2); 
dependent variable: CSCR  
 Albania Croatia Macedonia Czech 
Republic 
Slovak 
Republic 
Poland 
Constant 1.335 0.929 -0.309 1.121 -3.904** -3.330* 
CSCR(-1) 0.920*** 0.759*** 0.850 0.663*** 0.777*** 0.787*** 
IFR -0.883 0.366 0.244 -0.148 0.323 0.087 
∆NPL(-1) 0.783 --- --- --- --- --- 
∆NPLCS(-1) --- -1.949 -1.410 -0.669 0.471 -1.037* 
∆NPLPH(-1) --- 0.922 0.687 -0.955 -1.783 -3.024 
GDP(-1) 0.100 0.150 0.329** 0.833*** 0.493** 1.297*** 
Diagnostic statistics 
Adj. R-squared 0.934 0.786 0.931 0.957 0.940 0.929 
S.E. of Regr. 4.191 3.753 3.038 1.615 2.480 3.055 
DW stat. 1.737 1.722 1.572 2.348 1.774 1.811 
Harvey F stat. 1.288 4.836*** 0.713 0.319 1.513 0.771 
VIFa 1.054 1.338 (1.521) 1.017 (1.323) 1.054 (1.025) 0.751 (0.725) 0.255 (0.236) 
Observationsb  28 29 28 28 28 26 
a ∆NPLCS and ∆NPLPH as predictors for GDP; value in brackets: ∆NPLPH; for Albania: ∆NPL. b After 
adjustments. 
 
Table 4 presents the panel estimation results with a slightly changing lag-structure for the npl-
variables. Regressions include the entire period (panels 1 and 3) as well as the crisis period 
between 2009q1 and 2014q2 (panels 2 and 4). In the case of the WB group, no demand effect 
is evidenced in the two periods, not even with higher lags of the GDP variable. Thus, the 
Macedonian peculiarity seems to be an anomaly of minor relevance for the entire region. 
However, lending to the corporate sector is affected by changes in the npl ratio. A somewhat 
surprising result is that non-performing loans of the private household sector are the binding 
constraint, while npls to the corporate sector are not. A possible explanation is that banks 
prefer to reduce lending to the household sector, thereby protecting lending to the corporate 
sector. This emphasizes the bailout expectations on the banking sector in the region as 
described above. Significant period effects signal that differences among the countries 
involved are important.  
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Table 4: Results of panel OLS regressions; dependent variable: CSCR   
 WB-5 NMS-5 
 Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 Panel 4 
Period 2007q1-2014q2 2009q1-2014q2 2007q2-2014q2 2009q1-2014q2 
Constant 1.008 1.014 -1.016 -1.907*** 
CSCR(-1) 0.810*** 0.769*** 0.785*** 0.781*** 
IFR -0.033 -0.077 0.203* 0.215** 
∆NPLCS(-1) 0.118 0.180 -1.347** -0.326 
∆NPLCS(-2) -0.329 -0.206 -0.830 -0.294 
∆NPLPH(-1) -1.685** -2.002** --- --- 
GDP(-1) 0.052 -0.002 0.423*** 0.453*** 
Diagnostic statistics 
Adj. R-sq. 0.892 0.842 0.914 0.810 
DW stat. 1.520 1.520 1.436 1.328 
S. E. of  Reg.  3.378 3.350 3.370 3.378 
F-stat. (probab.) 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.000 
Period/Cross F 1.518* 1.659* 2.102* 2.447 
VIFa 9.464 (9.428) 1.349 
Observationsb 96 (5) 84 (5) 127 (5) 104 (5) 
Fixed effects  period period  crossc cross c 
a ∆NPLCS and ∆NPLPH as predictors for GDP; estimation for the entire period; value in brackets: ∆NPLPH. b 
Cross-sections in brackets. c Estimated with cross-section weights.   
 
With respect to the economically more advanced countries of the NMS-5 group, panel results 
confirm the single-country results on a broader scale, that is, lending is dominantly demand 
driven. Regressors are reduced to the NPLCS ratios as no data for private households are 
available for Slovenia. Npl-ratios do not show any significant impact on bank lending 
although the signs are negative. Interestingly, inflation implies that banks are ready to hold 
the real credit levels. However, results with cross-section effects are likely not robust enough. 
Redundant fixed effects tests suggest using period effects, but then, the GDP variable assumes 
a negative sign, and becomes insignificant. Standard errors of regression are at reasonable 
levels. The relatively high VIFs in the WB region do not necessarily signal that we must be 
overly concerned with collinearity given that the low number of observations contributes to 
higher VIFs.    
 
7. Policy and methodological conclusions  
The main objective of this study was to identify the binding constraints on growth in the 
economically less advanced countries of the Western Balkans. The results of the analysis 
indicate that the binding constraint on growth in the region is the high and still increasing 
share of npls primarily in the private household sector. This conclusion does not ignore 
systemic constraints in the financial sector, law enforcement, etc. as these constraints, which 
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are due to the level of systemic transformation to an advanced market economy, may 
disappear over the medium term. The main issue for growth enhancing policies in the West 
Balkans is the resolution and recovery of npls. Accordingly, disregarding this issue may 
hinder opportunities for innovation and long-run growth. Inaba et al. (2005) contend that the 
authorities’ forbearance against banks in their unwillingness to resolve the npl issue is 
responsible for the so-called lost decade in Japan. Krueger und Tornell (1999) argue similarly 
in the case of Mexico’s slow recovery. The Turkish example (2001-2004) demonstrates that it 
is possible to reduce npls to a non-detrimental level in a few years. The recent Irish example, 
(Central Bank of Ireland, 2013) presents a definitive line of action by the central bank, while 
the most recent example of Slovenia (Banka Slovenije. 2013) offers additional insight into 
how to improve the quality of assets in the banking sector. In the face of the bail-out 
expectations in the banking sector, the core of an appropriately tailored approach should 
consist of incentives and sanctions that prompt banks to solve the npl problem of households 
and corporations using their own capabilities. While it is not necessary to involve a large 
amount of government money to bail out the over-indebted non-financial corporate sector or 
the private households, it is not only necessary but also possible to delegate the task to the 
banking sector as, apparently, there is no banking crisis in any of the WB countries. On the 
contrary, the banking sector is appropriately capitalized and capable of disposing of sufficient 
loan-loss and other reserves.  
 
The second objective of the study was to test the applicability of the growth diagnostics 
approach to countries with structural and systemic transformation problems. The answer is 
positive when the original supply-side approach is completed by demand-side factors. Thus, 
the schematic application of the original approach should be replaced by a procedure that is 
more appropriate for the country or multi-country region under consideration. This adjustment 
reveals that the WB countries considered suffer from low credit supply, which hampers 
investments in productive and competitive capacities, while in the economically advanced 
five new member states of the EU, growth is hampered by demand constraints. The lack of 
sufficient robustness of estimation results calls for further research and, above all, for an 
improvement in the dataset.  
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